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CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS--VOTING RIGHTS OF PERSONAL REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF PROXY-HOLDER.--Pursuant to a separation agreement by which the
husband was to pay specified alimony, certain stock in a corporation of
which he was president was transferred as security for its payment to a
trustee who gave the husband an irrevocable proxy to vote the stock. In
case of the husband's death, the dividends on the stock were thereafter to
be the sole means of paying the specified maximum alimony, and upon the
death of the wife the stock was to revert to the husband's estate. The for-
mer contingency having occurred, the court, in In rc Schirmcr's TViI, 1 held
that the right to vote the stock passed to the personal representative of the
deceased husband and not to the trustee.
The right to vote stock is, as a rule, in the owner as disclosed by the
books of the corporation.2 This right passes to the executor or administrator
of a deceased stockholder of record without a formal transfer of the -hares
upon the books 3 and testamentary attempts to deprive the personal repre-
sentative of it have been held invalid.4 But the right to vote shares of stock
by proxy is usually personal, the relation being merely one of principal and
agents and would consequently not pass to the personal representative of
a proxy-holder. However, although a proxy was given to the husband in
the instant case, his status seems analogous rather to that of a pledgor than
to that of an agent and it seems logical that the right of a pledgor to vote,
reserved upon transfer of the stock to a pledgee, should pass to the pledgor's
estate on his death.6 While the husband's retention of voting pow r may
have been merely for the purpose of continuing personal control of the
corporation, a more logical interpretation would seem to be that his estate
was to exercise this power throughout the period of the trust for the pro-
tection of the reversion rights. And that the estate was no longer obligated,
while dividends on the stock were to be the sole means of payment of the
alimony, should not alter the result, since the personal representative and
subsequently the heirs would probably not be permitted by the court fla-
1231 App. Div. 625, 248 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1931).
2 Kresel v. Goldberg, 111 Conn. 475, 150 Atl. 693 (1930) ; Barnes v. All-
American Investing Co., 120 Misc. 706, 200 N. Y. Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
Trustees may therefore vote the shares of stock which they hold. In re
Ebbet's Will, 139 Misc. 250, 248 N. Y. Supp. 179 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; BAILAN-
TINE, MJA NUAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTIcE (1930) § 170.
3 Elevator Supplies Co. v. Wylde, 106 N. J. Eq. 163, 150 Atl. 347 (1930);
Townsend v. Winburn, 107 Misc. 443, 177 N. Y. Supp. 757 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
4 Billings v. Marshall Furnace Co., 210 Mich. 1, 177 N. W. 222 (1920);
cf. Randall & Sons v. Lucke, 123 Misc. 5, 205 N. Y. Supp. 121 (Sup. Ct
1924).
5 See Tompers v. Bank of America, 217 App. Div. 691, 217 N. Y. Supp.
67 (1st Dep't 1926); CUsHING, VoTING TRUSTS (1927) 162.
G Voting would be a so-called "power coupled with an interest" which is
not revocable at the will of the pledgee nor revoked by the death of either
party. See 1 M-EcHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 572, 574, 588; cf. Baird v.
Barnes, 235 N. W. 122 (S. D. 1931); Jennings v. Gallagher, 152 Atl. 802
(Vt. 1931).
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grantly to controvert the agreement by voting for the ultimate enrichment
of the estate to the detriment of the cestuij
CRIMINAL LAWY-INCONSISTENT vERDICTs-A defendant was indicted on three
separate counts, for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, for its
sale and for the maintenance of a common nuisance. The only evidence
offered by the state was the testimony of two Federal agents who had pur-
chased six drinks at the defendant's store. In Dunn V. United Statel a
conviction based upon the verdict of a jury finding the accused guilty of
maintaining the nuisance, but acquitting him of possession and sale, was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, one justice dissenting. The
majority opinion argued that if each offense had been tried under separate
indictments, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal
of one could not have been pleaded as res adjudicata of the others 2 and
that this rule was equally applicable to offenses charged under separate
counts of the same indictment. Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, argued that
the conviction was void because based upon an inconsistent verdict.
An acquittal on one count is at least conclusive with respect to the facts
actually at issue thereunder 3 and although the maintenance of a common
nuisance as defined by the National Prohibition Act 4 is a separate offense
from that of possession or sale, it can only be established by proof of an
unauthorized manufacture, sale, possession or barter of intoxicating liquor
in the place in question for a substantial period.6 A habit sufficient to war-
rant conviction under this section may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding a single sale,6 but when the existence of the only elements of
such a nuisance has, as in the instant case, been expressly negatived by the
findings of the jury on other counts, conviction on the nuisance count is
hardly logically sustainable.
The objection of inconsistency in the verdict has frequently been raised
when the findings of a jury have seemed on superficial examination to be
repugnant, as for example, where the accused has been acquitted of the
possession of intoxicating liquor and convicted of its sale., But no case
has been found in which it has prevailed unless, as in the instant case, the
offense negatived by acquittal has been a necessary constituent of the of-
fense for which the accused was convicted. Even under these circum-
7 Courts of equity have often restrained the holder of the legal title from
voting to the prejudice of another who has an interest in the stock. Haskell
v. Read, 68 Neb. 107, 93 N. W. 997 (1903); Burke v. Universal Granite
Quarries Co., 180 Wis. 520, 193 N. W. 517 (1923); 2 THOMPSON, CORPORA-
TIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 952. And they may compel execution of a proxy to
that person. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance, 205
Pa. 219, 54 Atl. 783 (1903) ; 2 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS, § 978.
152 Sup. Ct. 189 (U. S. 1932). A conviction of three men for murder
-was upheld on the authority of this case although the jury specifically ex-
onerated each defendant of having fired the fatal shot. Borum v. United
States, 52 Sup. Ct. 205 (U. S. 1932).
2 Cf. Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rlv. 535.
22 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 648.
441 STAT. 314 (1919), 27 U. S. C. § 33 (1926).
5 United States v. Ward, 6 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
6 Barker v. United States, 289 Fed. 249 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
7 Hesse v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 770 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) ; of. Kansas
v. Brundiage, 114 Kan. 849, 220 Pac. 1039 (1923) (conviction of burglary,
acquittal of larceny) ; Stockman v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A.
9th, 1925) (conviction of possession, acquittal of sale); see Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11, 47 Sup. Ct. 250, 254 (1927).
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stances, however, the prevailing rule in the federal courts 8 and in most
state courts s under state enforcement acts has been that where a jury con-
victs upon one count and acquits upon another, the verdict must stand
though there be no rational way of reconciling the conflicting conclusions.
On the other hand, the courts in the third and ninth circuits have adopted
the reasoning of the dissent.1 o The main objection to an inconsistent ver-
dict is that it indicates, on the part of the jury, an inadequate comprehen-
sion of the terms of the indictment. It is more probable, however, that the
jury is not unconvinced of the defendant's guilt but rather unwilling to
convict on several counts where the punishment which may. be imposed
under each is severe."
LABOR LAW-FREEDom OF SPEECH-INJUNCTION AGAINST INTEIERENCE=
WITH "YELLOW DOG" CONTRAT-In the case of K'racnmr Hosicrij Co. r.
Anerican Federatiom of Fdll Fashioned Hosiery Worl:rs 2 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania issued a perpetual injunction against an attorney
and representative of the union, restraining him not only from picketing
and intimidation but also from "sending libelous and scandalous letters,
pamphlets or newspapers" for the purpose of inducing employees of the
plaintiff to break their "individual contracts" of employment which were
in all respects similar to those in the Hitchnzan case.- In a strong dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Maxey argued that, since not a single act of violence
or intimidation on the part of the defendant was charged and the picket-
ing consisted merely in appearing at the gates of the Kraemer plant and
distributing pamphlets to its employees, the injunction in effect violated the
defendant's right of free speech.
This directly raises the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment is a
protection against abridgements of freedom of speech and press in the
field of labor disputes. Although a court of equity will enjoin the publica-
tion of a libel where property rights are involved and irreparable injuries
threatened, it should be observed that such injunctions have usually been
directed against particular statements. 3 This has been true in industrial
controversies where publications incident to a strike or boycott have been
enjoined.4 The injunction in the instant case, however, is directed against
nothing specific but embraces generally libel and scandal otherwise prohib-
ited by law, and the result is that the defendant is subjected to the addi-
8 Marshallo v. United States, 298 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) ; Gozner v.
United States, 9 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Carrignan v. United
States, 290 Fed. 189 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923); cf. Maceo v. United States, 46
F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (refusal to pass on objection at all).
9 Sichick v. State, 89 Ind. App. 132, 166 N. E. 14 (1929) ; State v. Daly,
77 Mont. 387, 250 Pac. 976 (1926). Contra: Kuck v. State, 149 Ga. 191, 99
S. E. 622 (1919) (acquittal of possession, conviction of sale); Davis v.
State, 43 Ga. App. 122, 157 S. E. 888 (1931) (acquittal of possession con-
viction of transportation).
'I Lambert v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); see
Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. United States, 295 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
"See Boone v. United States, 257 Fed. 963, 968 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919);
Steckler v.*United States, 7 F. (2d) 59, 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
1 157 Atl. 588 (Pa. 1931).
2 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65
(1917).
-E. g., Davis v. New England Railway Publishing Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89
.N. E. 565 (1909).
I-E. g., Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local No. 782, 35
Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132 (1922); Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture
Operators, 282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95 (1920).
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tional possibility of punishment in contempt proceedings without the right
to a jury trial. This is in effect a previous restraint on free speech, similar
to that held unconstitutional in the recent case of Near v. Minnesota.4 It
has been contended, however,-and the opinion in the Near case seems to
lend support to this view,-that the constitutional guaranty should not
apply to private disputes.6 To this it may be answered, that the conflict
of social and economic interests involved in labor disputes of this kind
clothes the controversy with a public interest sufficient to warrant the posi-
tion taken by the dissenting opinion.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-UNIFORMI ACTa-EFFECT ON HYPOTIIEOATION OV
INTANGIBLES--A bank accepted accounts receivable as security for loans
made under an agreement whereby the borrowing company was to hold In
trust for the bank any returned goods covered by the assigned accounts or
the proceeds thereof if sold. Goods were subsequently returned, but the
bank neither made a demand for an accounting nor inquiry as to the dispo-
sition of the goods. The pledgor having become bankrupt, its trustee in
bankruptcy sought to set aside the assignments as a fraudulent convey-
ance and to recover the proceeds. In Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.' the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that, contrary to
the terms of the loan contract, both the real agreement and the acts of the
parties were designed to reserve to the pledgor dominion over the returned
goods and consequently held that the entire transaction was void as against
creditors of the bankrupt.
A chattel mortgage under which the mortgagor, by express agreement
and not by mere acquiescence of the mortgagee,2 retains control over the
disposition of the goods is invalid,3 except where the mortgagor is merely
the agent of the mortgagee to sell the goods and pay over the proceeds or
substitute other goods therefor.4 The rule was said to rest upon ostensible
ownership and on that theory has been held inapplicable to the hypotheca-
tion of intangibles.5 The Supreme Court, however, in Benedict V. Ratner 0
denied the ostensible ownership basis of the doctrine and held that the
reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title
and creation of a lien conclusively imputed fraud and thus that the rule
could properly be applied to intangibles. It has been repeatedly contended
that the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, by specifying those convey-
5 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931), discussed by Shulman, Tie Si-
preme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Contract and Freedom of Speoch
(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 262.
0 See Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1148, 1155.
54 F. (2"d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). For a former appeal of the case see
38 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
2 Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Such agreement may
be dehors the contract. Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168, 1 N. E. 605 (1885).
3 Arbury v. Kocher, 18 F. (2d) 588 (W. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Wood v. Lowry,
17 Wend. 492 (N. Y. 1837). Contra: Harding v. Federal National Banc,
31 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
4 Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U. S. 513, 34 Sup. Ct. 166 (1913) ; Hickock v,
Cowperthwait, 210 N. Y. 137, 103 N. E. 1111 (1913). This exception ap-
plies to the hypothecation of intangibles also. Young v. Upson, 115 Fed.
192 (S. D. N. Y. 1902). In re Bernard & Katz, 38 F. (2d) 40. (C. C. A.
2d, 1930).
5 In re Michigan Furniture Co., 249 Fed. 978 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ; Stack-
house v. Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 73 N. Y. Supp. 203 (4th Dep't 1901).
8 268 U. S. 353, 45 Sup. Ct. 566 (1925). Subsequent creditors may attack
the conveyance as fraudulent. Eastern Sash & Door Co. v. Meister, 99 X. J.
Eq. 819, 134 Atl. 619 (1926).
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ances which are fraudulent without regard to intent,7 excluded by implica-
tion assignments of accounts with dominion reserved to the assignor and
thus abolished the rule of the Benedict case. While this argument accords
with the intention of the framers of the Act,s and has been adopted in
New York by two federal district courts,0 nevertheless the instant decision
in rejecting it is supported by the predominant authority.10 It is significant,
however, that the Uniform Chattel and Mortgage Act, not yet adopted in
any state, upholds as a mortgage an instrument which allows the borrower
freely to dispose of hypothecated goods or accounts."1 This, it seems, would
effectively alter the Benedict rule.
INco~m TAXATION-AsSIGNAIENT OF PARTNERSHIP PRours-In Burnet v.
Leiningerl the petitioner had in 1920 constituted his wife an equal partner
in his one-half interest in a partnership, his wife to share equally in the
profits and contribute equally to the losses. The fact of this assignment was
communicated to the representative of the other partners but the assent
of the partnership, required by the local law for the admission of a new
partner, was not shown. Furthermore, no change was made on the part-
nership accounts, one-half of the profits being returned to the petitioner
and by him deposited in a bank account owned jointly with his wife. The
petitioner's wife took no part in the partnership business nor did she con-
tribute to the partnership capital. The petitioner returned only one-half
of his share in the firm profits as income for the years 1920 to 1923, his
-wife returning the other half. The Commissioner, however, assessed the
petitioner's entire share of the profits to him, contending that he was tax-
able as if the marital agreement had not taken place. The Board of Tax
Appeals upheld the Commissioner, stressing the failure of the partnership
to record a change in the distribution of the profits, but the Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed this decision on the ground that regardless of whether
the petitioner's wife had become a partner by virtue of the agreement, she
had acquired a vested interest in partnership profits for which her hus-
band could not be taxed. On certiorari, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes sus-
tained the holding of the Board of Tax Appeals, devoting his opinion chiefly
7 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (1932) 174-179; Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act §§ 4-8.
8 See Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1917) 250-251, 255.
9 American Steamship Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F. (2d)
886 (W. D. N. Y. 1930), affd, 49 F. (2d) 766, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Com-
ment (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 1013. Another unreported decision by Judge
Knox in the New York District Court followed this case. See the instant
decision, szpra note 1, at 520.
10 In re Edelstein, 18 F. (2d) 963 (S. D. N. Y. 1926) ; In re M. G. Hoey
& Co., 19 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); In re Monumental Shoe Co., 14
F. (2d) 549 (D. Md. 1926); In re Lambert v. Braceland Co., 29 F. (2d)
758 (E. D. Pa. 1928); Blue v. Herkimer National Bank, 30 F. (2d) 25G
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929); In re Almond-Jones Co., 13 F. (2d) 152 (D. Md. 1920).
In these cases, although the jurisdiction had adopted the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act it was not mentioned. Nor does the Act change the
rule as to a mortgage on a stock of goods. In re Frey, 15 F. (2d) 871 (D.
Mlinn. 1926) ; In re Hanover Milling Co., 31 F. (2d) 442 (D. Mlinn. 1929) ;
McHenry v. Heiderick, 134 Misc. 546, 236 N. Y. Supp. I (Sup. Ct. Madi-
son County, 1929).
11 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (Supp. 1930) 79; Uniform Chattel Mort-
gage Act § 18.
1 U. S. Daily, March 16, 1932.
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to showing that since the wife had not become partner, her share in tho
partnership income was only "derivative."
The Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 provide that "the individuals carry-
ing on the business of a partnership shall be liable for income tax only
in their individual capacity," the net income of each partner being
determined by his distributive share of the partnership income, whether
distributed ornot.2 The Supreme Court in the principal case construed this
provision to tax the distributive share of each partner regardless of the
"beneficial" ownership of such share.3 Under such an interpretation, a
determination of the partners of a firm will automatically serve as a de-
termination of who is to be taxed for partnership profits, state law usually
serving as the criterion.4 But it has been argued with equal plausibility
that these provisions of the Revenue Act were intended merely to ensure
the taxation of undivided partnership profits not withdrawn from the busi-
ness and do not purport "to fix any policy as to who is to be deemed to
receive the income." z Either proceeding upon this latter assumption, or
ignoring the issue, most of the cases dealing with the allocation of income
tax as between assignor and assignee of partnership interests have dis-
cussed the problem in the light of general principles of income taxation.
For example, an assignment of unearned income to arise in the future
does not, standing alone, relieve the assignor from the burden of taxa-
tion, 6 nor doep it seem to be material that the assignment was for a con-
sideration 7 and irrevocable.8 Hence to avoid taxation, a partner must
transfer a "share" in the partnership as well as profits earned upon such
share,9 a distinction particularly difficult of application because of the pe-
culiar and ill-defined nature of partnership interests.1o The Board of Tax
Appeals, in upholding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has in general
discountenanced inter-family assignments, usually without attempting fine
distinctions, and sometimes being content to look merely to the partnership
240 STAT. 1070 (1918), 42 STAT 245 (1921), 26 U. S. C. § 218a (1926).
3 Cf. Harris v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 546, 547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930);
Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F. (2d) 414, 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), aff'd on another
ground, 15 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 759 (1926).4 But of. Pugh v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 600 (S. D. W. Va. 1931)
(wife held partner in equity though spouses prohibited from becoming
partners). For effect of the Uniform Partnership Act, compare Parshall v.
Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 318 (1927) with Colbert v. Commissioner, 12
B. T. A. 565 (1928).
5 Leininger v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 7, 8 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). See
dissents in Battleson v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 455, 464 (1931) sub-
stantially on the ground that an individual cannot be taxed for income en-
joyed by another. Cf. O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436, 437
(D. Conn. 1928).
6 Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd. 26 F. (2d)
1017 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; see S. l. 2763. 111-2, Cum. Bull. 53 (1924). Com-
pare Lucas v. Earle, 281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930) with Hall v.
Burnet, U. S. Daily, Nov. 18, 1931, at 193. But of. Young v. Gulchtel, 28
F. (2d) 789 (D. N. J. 1928).
7Larsen v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 308 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931) (community
property); Olds v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 560 (1929) ("sale of inter-
est"). See Note 43 HARv. L. REV. 1282.
8See Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1123; Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
663.
9 See Acquiescences and Non-Acquiescences of Commissioncrs (1931) IN-
TEENAL REVENUE CUMULATIVE BULLETIN X-1. Compare Van Brunt v. Com-
missioner, 11 B. T. A. 406 (1928) with Leydig v. Commissioner, 43 1". (2d)
494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930).
10 See Commissioners' note to §§ 23-25 of the Uniform Partnership Act,
Part 5.
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books to discover whom the firm considers entitled to profits." The few
federal court cases have adopted different courses of reasoning, the most
popular being that an assignment of income to arise in the future "has no
immediate effect." 2 Although the tests thus adopted are not fundamentally
repugnant, the difficulty of applying them, together with a consistent fail-
ure precisely to define the nature of the interest subject to taxation, have
led to holdings difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
INCOME TAXATION-INTERSTATE ALLOCATION-INTERCRPORATE CONTRAcTS--.
Wisconsin corporation contracted with its foreign parent sales corporation
which did no business in Wisconsin to manufacture soap on a "cost plus"
basis. In assessing the corporation for income tax purposes, the state tax
officials disregarded the contract and this action was approved by the dis-
trict court,' which set forth collateral facts to show that the cost plus
were in fact mere bookkeeping devices -and held them to constitute a fraud
on the income tax laws. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Palhwlive Co. v. Conway,3 emphasizing the peculiar
value of the Wisconsin factory to this particular enterprise, affirmed the
district court after a careful analysis of the cost basis of the contracts
involved. It pointed out that the failure to include in this basis items such
as management, general overhead including rent and depreciation, interest
on funds supplied by the parent, and a fair middleman's profit on raw
materials furnished by the parent, resulted in a great understatement of
the actual manufacturing cost.
Disregard of intercorporate contracts - in determining the taxable in-
come of the local subsidiary has been countenanced when a minority stock-
holder of the subsidiary could validly have objected to the contract," and
when the contract operated as a device to distribute untaxed corporate
profits to the parent shareholder.6 If the contract has properly been dis-
regarded, the taxing state even when using a statutory allocation fraction
is limited in its assessments to a share of total income, wherever earned,
which in "appropriate proportion" reflects the business transacted in the
" Cf. Battleson v. Commissioner, supra. note 5. But cf. Kier v. Commis-
sioner, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929) (contribution to capital).
See Harris v. Commissioner, sipra note 3, at 547. But cf. Copland v.
Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) (joint venture).
'43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930).
- The court points to (1) inconsistencies in the interest and by-product
accounts between subsidiary and parent; (2) the fact that the subsidiary
sold directly to Wisconsin wholesalers for $9.24 per gross whereas it re-
ceived but $3.52 from the parent; and (3) a drop-off of over 90% in gross
profit as between years before and years after the contracts with the parcnt
were entered into.
3 U. S. Daily, Feb. 20, 1932, at 4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
4 Magill, Allocation of Incone by Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HArv.
L. Rnv. 935; Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Mlanipzdation of Holding Cow-
pany (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 189; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of In-
come for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1075, 1085; Huston, Allo-
cation of Corporate Net Income for Purposes of Taxation (1932) 26 ILL. L.
REv. 725, 751; Comment (1931) 40 YAIM L. J. 1273, 1280; Note (1931) 31
COL. L. Rnv. 719; Jones, Present Problems of the Consolidated Return
(1929) NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, 414, 420.
5 Cliffs Chem. Co. v. Tax Commission, 193 Wis. 295, 301, 214 N. W. 447
(1927), dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 277 U. S. 574,
48 Sup. Ct. 435 (1927).'
6 Magill, op. cit. supra. note 1, at 937; Buick Motor Co. v. City of Mil-
waukee, 48 F. (2d) 801, 803 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) affirming 43 F. (2d) 385
(E. D. Wis. 1930), cert. den. 52 Sup. Ct. 34 (Oct. 26, 1931).
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state.7 In not mentioning these established criteria and resting its decision
on an accounting basis, the court in the instant case seems to imply that,
given an intercorporate contract which pays to a local subsidiary the
"fair" cost of its services plus even a comparatively small profit, income
tax officials will be required to base their estimate of the subsidiary's state
income on the contract and on the separate accounting systems of the cor-
porate organization, rather than on a statutory allocation fraction or
empirical estimates.8 It remains to be seen whether the courts will be oven
more ready in such a case to find the contract fair and to require the use of
the organization's separate accounting than they have been in the ease
of a single departmentalized corporation in which one department sells to
another.9
INCOME TAXATION-INCOME FROM TRUST ESTATE BEFORE DISTRIBUTION TO
I3NEFICLARIES-Under the Federal Revenue Acts trustees are charged with
the duty of paying a tax on income derived from the trust estate which is
properly accumulated or held for future distribution under the terms of the
trust.' But as to income which is to be distributed currently to the bene-
ficiaries a deduction is allowed, the amount of which "shall be included In
computing the net income of the beneficiaries whether distributed to them
or not." 2 In the recent case of Columbia & Fidelity Thust Co. v. Lucas,3
the trustee sought a refund of taxes paid under these provisions on the
ground that a court of the state which controlled the administration of the
trust had since construed the terms of the will creating it as requiring the
net income received each year to be divided initially into three equal parts,
one for each beneficiary, and the balances, remaining each year after the
beneficiaries had received what the trustee in his discretion distributed to
them, to be carried on separate trust accounts for the benefit of the bene-
ficiaries until the main trust should be finally terminated. The court, how-
eyer, after dismissing the contention that it was bound by the state court's
construction, went on to construe the will to require that the balances
should be held as part of the main trust and not separately, and accord-
ingly decided that the trustee was the proper person to pay the tax on the
amount of such balances.
For the purpose of determining whether the trustee or the beneficiary
is liable to the tax the term "distributed" as used in the revenue act has
been interpreted not necessarily to refer to the actual passing of the income
7 The court in the instant case felt obliged to distinguish away the case of
Hans Rees & Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385 (1931),
where the question was solely one of allocation and not at all one of at-
tempted tax avoidince through intercorporate contract. From the district
court's opinion it appears that the mode of allocation used was quite fair
granted that the contracts could be disregarded. See Palmolive Co. v. Con-
way, supra note 1, at 231.
8 "A stipulated percentage of profit upon manufacturing cost might in
many cases be fair enough if all cost factors were included." U. S. Daily,
Feb. 20, 1932, at 4.
0 See Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928)
and Standard Oil Co. v. Tax Commission, 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. WV. 85 (192D)
for departmentalization cases where officials were required to abide by the
company's separate accounting. But see Kresge Co. v. Bennett, 51 F. (2d)
353 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) where under the circumstances the court said that
separate accounting would not fairly reflect the state income by which to
measure a New York "franchise" tax.
126 U. S. C. § 960 (a) and (b) (1928).
226 U.S.C. § 960 b (2) (1928).
3 52 F. (2d) 298 (W. D. Ky. 1931).
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into the uncontrolled possession of the beneficiary, but rather to its separa-
tion and segregation from the trust estate so that it no longer forms any
part thereof.4 Thus in Wilcuts v. Ordway G a trustee was held not taxable
as to a portion of the income which was not actually handed over to the
beneficiaries but was invested, according to the testator's directions in
securities which were segregated from the carpus and held in a separate
repository, and recorded on separate books. On the other hand, the income
has been held taxable to the trustee where, although separate accounts
were kept, the beneficiaries were entitled to the accumulated income only in
the event that the discretion of the trustee to make an unequal distribution
thereof was not exercised before they reached their majority, It seems
clear that under the state court's construction of the trust in the instant
case the income had been distributed within the rule laid down by the
Ordway case. And in view of the fact that the trustee was bound to ad-
minister the trust in accordance with the state court's decree, it may rea-
sonably be argued that the federal court, even in the absence of any com-
pelling precedent should have adopted it for the purpose of determining
the incidence of the tax.7 It should be noted, however, that in cases of
this kind the income thus segregated and accumulated is withheld from the
beneficiary, and the courts might well have taken the position that the
beneficiary should not be taxed except as to that portion of the income to
which he is beneficially entitled during any taxable year. Distribution in
this latter sense would seem to be more nearly in harmony with the pur-
pose of the statute, viz., to let the tax follow the income.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-RATE REGULATION-INTERCORPORATE CONTIRCTs-A cor-
poration operating a natural gas distributing system in Kansas filed with
the state Public Service Commission an application for an increase in
rates. By far the largest item of operating expense shown by the petition
was the cost of gas purchased from an interstate pipe line company which
owned all the capital stock of the applicant. The commission insisted that,
in order to determine the reasonableness of the requested increase, inquiry
must be made into the propriety of the rate charged by the holding com-
pany and upon the applicant's refusal to make any showing in this regard,
dismissed the petition. A bill to enjoin the enforcement of the existing
rate schedule was thereupon brought by the applicant before a statutory
three judge court. It was there dismissed on the ground that until the
applicant had produced the required evidence, it had not exhausted its
remedy before the commission. In affirming the judgment of dismissal
in Western Distributing Co. -v. Public Serrice Commissio of Kansas,2 the
United States Supreme Court brushed aside the objection that it imposed
4 Willcuts v. Ordway, 19 F. (2d) 917, 918 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927).
5 Ibid.
0sHenn v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 190 (1927); Cf. Scars, Roebuck &
Co., Employees' Savings & Profit Sharing Pension Fund v. Commissioner,
17 B. T. A. 22 (1929).
7 The Board of Tax Appeals had shown a tendency to adopt the state
court's construction, Appeal of Catherine Erswell, 1 B. T. A. 1254 (1925) ;
and to give weight to the manner in which the trustee has actually han-
dled the income as well as to the bare language of the trust instrument.
See Appeal of Grace Scripps Clark, 1 B. T. A. 491, 490-7 (1925). It is
significant, however, that, in the instant case, not only had the trustee paid
the tax over a period of ten years but also the state court's construction
had not been contested, but had been agreed upon by the only parties in-
terested in the estate. But see Brenneman v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A.
544, 552 (1928).
'52 Sup. Ct. 283 (1932).
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a burden on interstate commerce and stated that in view of the relation-
ship of the two corporations the state authority was entitled to fullor evi-
dence of the reasonableness of the charges than would be required were
the parties dealing at arms' length.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smith V. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co.2 it was apparently established that the existence of a parent-
subsidiary relationship between two corporations was not material to a
determination of the reasonableness of charges made by one to the other
in the absence of a clear showing of bad faith. But in the Smith ease,
which involved chatges made by a subsidiary supply company to a utility
owned by the same parent, it was held that their reasonableness was not
established in the absence of findings of the cost to the supply company of
the specific services rendered. The Court neglected, however, to give any
indication of how the data necessary to support such findings was to be
obtained. The instant case, in placing upon the applicant for a rate in-
crease the burden of producing the evidence necessary to establish the
reasonableness of an intercorporate charge, indicates how the rule of the
Smith case may be made effective and lends countenance to a practice al-
ready adopted by at least a few of the state commissions.4 It remains to
be seen whether a commission will also be able to place the burden of proof
on a utility in the converse situation where it attempts to lower the utility's
rates on its own motion. The Wisconsin commission had dared to do go
long before the Smith case.6 In view of the emphasis placed by the Court
in the instant case upon the danger inherent in a close interrelationship
of supply and distributing companies that charges, ultimately the basis of
a retail rate, will be arbitrarily established without any reference to the
true value of the services rendered, it is predicted that such an extension
of the rule would be successful.
SURETYSHIP-SURETY'S DEFENSES-CHANGE IN PRINCIPAL DEBTOR-In the
recent case of Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman I the defendant guaranteed pay-
inent for goods sold on credit by the plaintiff. The buyer subsequently
incorporated his business, taking all the shares except those necessary to
qualify directors. The plaintiff, who had notice of the change, sued the
surety for the price of goods sold after incorporation. A judgment for
the defendant was reversed on the ground that, to prevent injustice, the
corporation and individual buyer should be considered as one.2
2282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 15 (1930). See Comment (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 809.
3 Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318, 42 Sup.
Ct. 486 (1921); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923). See Lilienthal, Tleo Vvgula-
tiom of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV. 404, 412 fr.
4 Re New York Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925C 767 (N. J. Board of Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1924); Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925D 661
,(Wis. Ry. Comm. 1925); Re Point Pleasant Natural Gas Co., P. U. B.
1927B 805 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927); Re Cumberland & Allegheny
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928B 20 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927). See Comment
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1088.
SRe Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., P. U. R. 1927E 212 (Wis. Ry. Comm.);
Re Wisconsin Public Utility Co., P. U. R. 1930A 119 (Wis, Ry. Comm.
1929).
1 6 Pac. (2d) 251 (Cal. 1931).
SfCf. Standard Plumbing Supply Co. v. Messamina La Conte, 178 N. .
611 (Mass. 1931); cf. lAarshall-Wells Co. v. Kramlich, 46 Idaho 355, 267
Pac. 611 (1928) (debtor partnership represented itself to be a corporation
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The rule that a change in the personnel of the principal debtor to whom
credit is extended under a continuing guarantee releases the non-consent-
ing surety-guarantor as to credit subsequently extended 3 has quite con-
sistintly been applied to changes in the membership of a partnership.4
The basis of these decisions is said to be the reliance which the surety
places in the responsibility of the individual members at the time the
obligation is assumed.5 The surety is not released, however, by a merely
formal change in the principal's business, as for example a change in the
name,6 or a statutory extension of its limited e.,dstence.7 The holding in
the instant case, where corporation and stockholders are practically indis-
tinguishable, could not be in any way prejudicial to the surety, provided
the courts will in like fashion refuse to distinguish them in case of a suit
for reimbursement. It may be noted, however, that the incorporation of
the creditor has been held to release the guarantor,8 although a change in
the personnel of either debtor or creditor has usually been given identical
treatment.9
and guarantor, a partner, held estopped to plead the subsequent incorpora-
tion as discharge).
3 See Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 97 and cases therein cited.4 Where a new partner comes in, see Dupee v. Blake, 148 Ill. 453, 35
N. E. 867 (1893); Spokane Union Stockyards Co. v. id. Casualty Co.,
105 Wash. 306, 178 Pac. 3 (1919). But cf. Gilbert v. State Insurance Co.,
31 Kan. App. 1, 44 Pac. 442 (1896) (in a suit on a fidelity bond new part-
ner was held to have had nothing to do with the agent's service of his em-
ployer). Where there is withdrawal of a partner see Byers v. Heckman
Grain Co., 112 Iowa 451, 84 N. W. 500 (1900).
- Cf. the unique holding in Richardson v. County of Steuben, 226 N. Y.
413, 122 N. E. 449 (1919) that the issue is whether the guarantor in-
tended the withdrawal of a partner to affect his liability.
6 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462, 114 N. E. 181 (1910). Cf. Rouss
v. King, 74 S. C. 251, 54 S. E. 615 (1906).
7 People v. Backus, 117 N. Y. 196, 22 N. E. 759 (1889).
sJohn Wanamaker v. Shoemaker, 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 473 (1918) (in-
corporation of partnership).
O See Comment (1909) 57 U. PA. L. Rr. 327 and cases therein cited;
Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 97.
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